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Abstract
We study incumbency advantage in a dynamic game with incomplete information
between an incumbent and a voter. The incumbent knows the true state of the
world, e.g., the severity of an economic recession or the level of criminal activities,
and can choose the quality of his policy. This quality and the state of the world
determine the policy outcome, i.e., the economic growth rate or the number of
crimes committed. The voter only observes the policy outcome and then decides
whether to reelect the incumbent or not. Her preferences are such that she would
reelect the incumbent under full information if and only if the state of the world is
above a given threshold level. In equilibrium, the incumbent is reelected in more
states of the world than he would be under full information. In particular, he
chooses inefficient policies and generates mediocre policy outcomes whenever the
voter’s induced belief distribution will be such that her expected utility of reelecting
the incumbent exceeds her expected utility of electing the opposition candidate.
Hence, there is an incumbency advantage through inefficient policies. We provide
empirical evidence consistent with the prediction that reelection concerns may
induce incumbents to generate mediocre outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Would an incumbent political leader who is known to be tough on crime want to be tough
on crime before elections if he is more likely to be reelected when crime is perceived as
a serious problem? Similarly, would an incumbent who is known to be good in fostering
growth really want to efficiently fight a recession before elections if he is more likely to
be reelected if the economy does not do too well? These are the questions addressed in
the present paper.
We study a two period game with incomplete information and two strategic players,
an incumbent and a voter. The policy outcome, i.e., the crime rate or the severity of a
recession, is a function of the quality of the policy chosen by the incumbent and of the
state of the world. Assume that the decisive policy dimension is crime. For a given state
of the world, the policy outcome, i.e. the crime rate, is high (low) if the quality of the
policy is low (high). Information is asymmetric in that the incumbent knows both the
state of the world and the quality of the policy he chose while the voter observes neither.
She only observes the outcome, then updates her beliefs about the state of the world
and decides whether to reelect the incumbent or not. Both players dislike high policy
outcomes, and the incumbent cares strongly about his reelection. We assume that there
are two possible types of incumbents, L and R. The type who is not the incumbent
is the opposition candidate in the election. Hence, there are two versions of this game
that differ in the incumbent’s (and the opposition candidate’s) type. Type L is more
reluctant than the voter to spend public funds to reduce the policy outcome and type R
is less reluctant than the voter. Under full information, the voter would therefore elect
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candidate L if the state of the world were below a certain threshold level, and candidate
R otherwise.
The following results are obtained. In every Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),
an incumbent of type L has no incentive to conduct low quality policies, as this would
increase his disutility from high policy outcomes and could, on top of that, make his
reelection less likely. An incumbent of type R faces conflicting incentives when it comes
to his quality choice. Low quality policies decrease his utility due to higher policy
outcomes, but potentially also improve his reelection chances. In every PBE, such an
incumbent chooses low quality policies in some states of the world.1 This makes the voter
uncertain about the true state of the world because now an observed policy outcome is
consistent with either a low quality policy in a low state or a high quality policy in a
high state. In equilibrium, she must therefore assign positive probability on each of the
two states. The incumbent chooses low quality policies only in those low states where
the voter’s induced belief distribution is such that her expected utility of reelecting him
exceeds her expected utility of voting for the opposition candidate. Therefore, it is
optimal for the voter to reelect the incumbent whenever she is uncertain about the state
of the world.
Moreover, all PBE have the same structure and all but one are characterized by an
incumbency advantage, though the voter is fully rational and therefore aware of the fact
that the incumbent has incentives to choose inefficient policies in order to induce her to
reelect him. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first model in which an incumbent
1To simplify the exposition of the paper, we will introduce the additional restriction that off equi-
librium beliefs are formed under the “Laplacian” assumption that the error that gives rise to some off
equilibrium observation occurs with the same probability from any source it can come from. The PBE
satisfying this restriction is unique.
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can use inefficient policies to successfully induce rational, Bayesian updating voters to
reelect him in states of the world in which they would be better off electing the opposition
candidate.
A fairly vast political economics literature analyzes strategic interactions between
incumbents and voters. In Rogoff and Siebert (1988), Alesina and Cukierman (1990),
Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001) and Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), incumbents take
(socially) costly actions in equilibrium aimed at increasing their reelection probability.2
None of them, however, has the feature that an incumbent deliberately makes the voters
uncertain in such a way that they reelect him in states of the world in which they would
be better off electing the opposition candidate.3
Berrebi and Klor (2006) analyze a model of election and terroristic attacks in the con-
text of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In their model the Palestinian player determines
the level of terror attacks to target the beliefs of the Israeli voters. This is similar to
our model, where the voter’s beliefs are successfully targeted by the incumbent. Berrebi
and Klor also provide empirical evidence that the electorate’s preferences depend on the
state of the world, which supports one of our main assumptions.
Alternative explanations of incumbency advantage are based on personal votes and
face recognition (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2000; Prior, 2006) or on the
idea that incumbents are of a higher average quality than the challengers (e.g., Cox and
2In Rogoff and Siebert (1988), which is closest to our model, the incumbent sets a low tax rate before
elections (which later leads to a sub-optimally high seignorage tax) in an attempt to convince the voter
that he is competent and able to provide public goods efficiently. However, the equilibrium in their
model is fully separating. Hence, the voter always correctly infers the incumbent’s type, and thus the
incumbent cannot improve his reelection prospects in equilibrium.
3In Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990), the incumbent’s policy choice is
distorted by another strategic consideration, namely that of constraining the choice set of a successive
government whose policy objectives differ.
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Katz, 1996; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Bevia´ and Llavador, 2006). Our model provides
a complementary explanation for why incumbency can matter for electoral prospects.
Our paper is also consistent with the finding in the empirical political business cycle
literature that “economic activity [is] significantly higher under Democrats than Repub-
licans in the first half of their terms” in the U.S. (Drazen 2000). In particular, it provides
an explanation why economic activity tends to slow down at the end of the first term
under Democrats but not under Republicans: Democrats may deliberately slow down
the economy prior to elections because their reelection prospects improve when voters
have the impression that the economy is in bad shape.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model.
Section 3 solves the model under the assumption that in period one the incumbent can
only choose the quality of his policy, which the voter cannot observe. Section 4 solves the
model under the assumption that the incumbent can choose in period one both quality
and the budget size, the latter being observed by the voter. Section 5 provides empirical
evidence supporting both the assumptions and the predictions of our model. Section 6
concludes. The appendix contains lengthy proofs and a technical robustness result.
2 The Model
In this section, we first present our model and then briefly discuss the main assumptions.
There are two periods t = 1, 2 and two parties, L and R. In period one, one of these
parties is in office for exogenous reasons. The party in office is called the incumbent and
labelled I. At the end of period one, the median voter either reelects the incumbent or
replaces him by the other party. Throughout we refer to an incumbent as “he” and to
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the voter as “she”. Since there are two types of incumbents I ∈ {L,R}, there are two
versions of this game differing in the incumbent’s type. In each version, there are two
strategic players, the incumbent and the voter.
Information: Information is asymmetric in that the voter does not know the state
of the world z whereas I does. Specifically, we assume that z is a random draw from
the commonly known distribution F (z) with continuous density f(z) and full support
on [a, a], i.e., f(z) > 0 for all z ∈ [a, a].4 The state z is the same in both periods and
known by the incumbent in period one and in case the incumbent is replaced, by the
party that replaces him in period two. The voter, however, does not observe z. Her prior
belief that state z ∈ [a, a] is realized is thus µ(z) = f(z). But the voter observes the
policy outcome yt in period t, which depends both on z and the actions undertaken by
the incumbent. We can think of z as the state of the economy and yt as the severity of a
recession. Alternatively, one can think of z as the number of potential delinquents and
yt as the number of crimes committed.
Timing and Actions: After having learned z at the beginning of period one, the
incumbent can choose between low and high public expenditures, i.e., he chooses a
budget b1(z) ∈ {b, b}, with b < b. The choice of b1 is observed by the voter. In addition,
I also has the choice between low and high quality policies q1(z) ∈ {q, q}, with q < q.
The quality qt can be thought of as measuring the efficiency with which money is spent on
stimulating short-run economic growth or the efficiency with which police are employed
to fight crime. This choice does not involve a direct cost in terms of expenditures. The
4Some restrictions on a and a will be introduced and discussed below.
6
Figure 1: Timing.
key assumption is that q1(z) is not observed by the voter.
At the end of period one, the voter observes the budget b1 and the policy outcome y1,
and updates her beliefs about the true state of the world, µ(z | b1, y1). She then plays
v(b1, y1) ∈ {l, r}, with v(b1, y1) = k meaning that after observing b1 and y1 she (re)elects
party k = L,R. Note that the policy outcome yt serves as a signal for the voter about
the true state of the world z. Since the incumbent can affect yt with his actions while the
party in opposition cannot, there is an asymmetry between the two parties.5 In period
two, the party in office chooses the budget b2(z) ∈ {b, b} and the quality q2(z) ∈ {q, q}.
The policy outcome y2 is then realized and the game ends.
The timing is summarized in Figure 1, which also contains the description of two
separate games or subgames which we will study in turn. The q-Game is identical to the
full game except that in the q-Game the budget b1 is exogenously given in period one.
It is analyzed in Section 3. Because the voter is not at a singleton information set when
casting her vote, the q-Game is not a proper subgame of the full game.
5The assumption that the party in opposition does not know z in t = 1 is without loss of generality
as this party can take no action in t = 1.
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Figure 2: Technology.
Technology: The policy outcome yt depends on the state z and the policies bt and qt
as follows:
yt = y(bt, qt, z), (1)
where y(.) satisfies 0 < y(b, qt, z) < y(b, qt, z) for any qt and z and y(bt, q, z) < y(bt, q, z)
for any bt and z. Moreover, we assume that y(bt, qt, z) is continuous and increasing in z
and that ∂y(b, qt, z)/∂z > ∂y(b, qt, z)/∂z for any qt and z. This implies that an increase
in z has a stronger effect on outcome yt if the budget devoted to reducing yt is small than
when it is large.6 The technological relationship between states z, policies q ∈ {q, q} and
outcomes y1 is illustrated in Figure 2. Observe that the horizontal axis depicts the states
z observed by the incumbent. Hence, the horizontal axis is the basis for the incumbent’s
policy choices. Under our assumptions on timing and information, this choice occurs
first and the voter thereafter only observes y1. Thus, the vertical axis depicting y is the
basis for the voter’s decision.
6A simple technology satisfying this requirement is y = A(bt, qt)z with A(b, qt) < A(b, qt).
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Payoffs: The players L and R and the voterM differ with respect to their preferences,
in particular in how they value the trade-off between the disutility of yt and the expen-
ditures bt incurred to reduce yt. Each agent i’s instantaneous von Neuman-Morgenstern
utility when the policy bt is implemented and the outcome is yt is
ui = −αibt − c(yt), (2)
where c(yt) is continuous and satisfies c
′(yt) > 0 and c′′(yt) ≥ 0.7 The players’ preference
parameters are ordered as follows:
αL > αM > αR.
In the crime example, this preference ordering implies that L is more reluctant to spend
money to fight crime than the voter, who in turn is more reluctant to do so than R. In
the economic growth example, it would imply that L has the weakest and R the strongest
willingness to foster short-run growth.8 Replacing yt by y(bt, qt, z) in (2) we can write
i’s utility in state z with budget bt and quality qt as
ui(bt, qt, z) = −αibt − c(y(bt, qt, z)). (3)
Observe that ui(bt, q, z) > ui(bt, q, z) for all bt and z because y(bt, q, z) < y(bt, q, z) and
c′(yt) > 0.
7Instead of having just one voter, we could assume that there is a continuum of voters all with utility
function (2), but with different αi’s. The voter with the median αi would then be decisive, and we could
focus on the game between this voter and the incumbent.
8In general, a left party may be more reluctant than a right party to spend money on crime deterrence
if this requires cuts in, say, public education or public health expenditures. For the growth example,
the notation may be slightly misleading. According to empirical evidence, left-wing parties are more
willing to foster short-run economic growth. Consequently, R stands for a left-wing incumbent and L
for a right-wing incumbent in the growth application. This should be kept in mind in the empirical
analysis below.
9
In addition, we assume throughout that parties L and R have lexicographic prefer-
ences for being in office and, of course, prefer being in office for two periods to being
in office for just one period. To ease the exposition, we assume that the voter elects R
in case she is indifferent between L and R. Without loss of generality, we assume that
there is no discounting.9
Solution Concept: The solution concept we employ is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE). We add the following restriction on the voter’s off equilibrium beliefs: When
observing an outcome y1 that cannot result from the incumbent having played his equi-
librium strategy, the voter has “Laplacian” beliefs, i.e., she assumes that the incumbent
may have played the ”wrong” q1(z) with the same error probability ε > 0 at each state
z consistent with y1. This implies that the voter’s off equilibrium beliefs over the states
z that can technically lead to the observed outcome y1 must equal her prior beliefs over
these states.
Motivation: We now briefly discuss the main assumptions made above. The assump-
tions that the government is better informed about the state of nature z than the public
and that its quality choice qt is not observed by the voter may appear controversial at
first. Note, however, that all that is required is that the voter does not observe z and
qt, not that z and qt are unobservable at all costs. One may thus interpret our model as
one in which there are two policy instruments, a first one, bt, which the voter observes at
low or zero costs, and a second one, qt, which the voter could only observe at costs he is
9To see why this is without loss of generality, observe first that nothing changes for politicians as
long as they have sufficiently strong preferences for being in office. Second, on election day the voter’s
decision depends only on her expectation about the differences in outcomes when L or when R is in
office. This expectation will not be affected by discounting.
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not willing to bear. These assumptions are substantiated by robust empirical evidence
that shows that voters are, in general, quite poorly informed.10
The assumption that parties differ with respect to their preferences (i.e. αL > αR) is
not directly testable. However, if a party in office has some systematic effect on policy
outcomes and if it chooses policies to obtain outcomes that it prefers, differences in
preferences should be reflected by differences in outcomes. It is a well established fact of
the empirical literature on political business cycles that economic policy outcomes differ
depending on which party is in office (see Drazen, 2000).11 In Section 5, we also provide
empirical evidence that homicide rates differ depending on the incumbent’s political
orientation (see Table 1 below).
The dichotomous policy choice sets of a party in office deserves some commenting as
well. Though we do not do so in this paper, it can easily be shown that qualitatively all
our results go through if the quality choice is continuous, i.e. if qt(z) ∈ [q, q], provided
the difference between q and q is not too large. The main results should also go through
with a continuous budget choice bt(z) as long as the voter is better off in period two with
R’s budget choice if the state z is high, and with L’s budget choice otherwise.
The two period structure is, obviously, the simplest game form that allows for re-
election and hence incumbency advantage. The discussion of the implications of our
restriction on off equilibrium beliefs is best postponed and is done after Proposition 3.
10See Bartels (1996) or Blendon et al. (1997). Of course, given the small probability that they can
affect election outcomes, individual voters’ ignorance may be perfectly rational.
11This is also borne out in our data (see Table 2).
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3 The q-Game
In this section, we focus on the case where the budget in period one is exogenous such
that the incumbent can only choose quality q1(z) ∈ {q, q} in period one. In period
two, the party in office can still choose both the budget b2(z) ∈ {b, b} and the quality
q2(z) ∈ {q, q}. This corresponds to a game that is slightly simpler than the full game of
Section 4. Analyzing this game will not only be helpful in solving the full game, but is
interesting in itself because it contains the main mechanism that allows an incumbent of
type R to gain an advantage over the opposition candidate.
3.1 The Period Two Subgame
We first derive the policies that the parties L and R play in period two when in office.
We begin with their choice of quality q2(z) ∈ {q, q}. Since ui(b2, q, z) > ui(b2, q, z) for
any i, z and any budget b2, it follows:
Lemma 1 In period two, q is a dominant strategy for any party in office.
We next show for which states of the world each player i prefers policies (b, q) to (b, q)
in period two. Define z˜i as the threshold value of z that makes i indifferent and let
∆ui(z) ≡ ui(b, q, z)− ui(b, q, z). (4)
Observe that ∆ui(z) is the difference between the utility derived under b and b when the
state is z and the quality is q. Then, z˜i satisfies ∆ui(z˜i) = 0.
Lemma 2 For each player i, a unique threshold z˜i exists, such that i is strictly better
off with (b, q) than with (b, q) if z > z˜i, and strictly worse off if z < z˜i. These thresholds
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are ordered as
z˜R < z˜M < z˜L. (5)
The proof is in Appendix A. This lemma implies that L prefers (b, q) for all but those
z’s that exceed z˜L, while R prefers (b, q) for all but those z’s below z˜R. The state of
the world z at which the voter changes his preferred policy is in-between at z˜M . For
notational ease, we let
z˜ ≡ z˜M .
Recall that the support of the states z is [a, a]. We now introduce a simplifying assump-
tion on the parameters z˜i and their relation to the support of z.
Assumption 1
z˜R < a < z˜ < a < z˜L.
This assumption serves two purposes. First, it makes sure that there are no regions
(namely, z < z˜R or z > z˜L) where both parties agree on the optimal policy, which would
make the voter indifferent and would therefore not be a particularly insightful setup
to analyze. Second, it guarantees that the budget under which the voter is better off
depends on z, which, in turn, implies that the voter does not always prefer the same
party.
Lemmas 1 and 2 and Assumption 1 imply:
Proposition 1 When in office in period two, R plays (b, q) and L plays (b, q) for all z.
Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 imply that the voter is better off with L’s policy if z < z˜,
and with R’s policy if z > z˜. This leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Under full information about z, the voter elects L if z < z˜ and R otherwise.
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3.2 The Equilibrium of the q-Game
We now focus on period one and derive the equilibria of the two versions of the q-Game,
one with incumbent R and one with incumbent L.
We first analyze how the voter updates her beliefs about z after observing a policy
outcome y1. For a given budget b1, any observed y1 is in principle consistent with, at
most, two different z’s. Denote by z(y1) the state of the world consistent with quality
choice q and observation y1 and by z(y1) the state consistent with q and y1. That is,
z(y1) and z(y1) are implicitly defined by
y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)) and y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)). (6)
Observe that because ∂y(b, q, z)/∂z > 0 and y(b, q, z) > y(b, q, z), it follows that
z(y1) > z(y1).
The property that no z other than z(y1) and z(y1) can a priori be consistent with an ob-
served y1 restricts the voter’s beliefs µ(z|b1, y1) substantially and implies in particular:12
Lemma 3 For a given budget b1 and an observed policy outcome y1, at most the states
z(y1) and z(y1) are feasible. For all feasible y1, the voter’s beliefs thus satisfy
µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = 1− µ(z(y1)|b1, y1).
Figure 3 shows that at most two z’s are consistent with an observed y1.
12Clearly, z(y1) and z(y1) are both consistent with y1 only if they are both in the support of z. We
come back to that point shortly when making an assumption that guarantees that this is the case in
the “relevant range” (where we will also make clear what the relevant range is). Any other feasible y1
is consistent with one z.
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Figure 3: Any y1 is consistent with at most two states.
Note that when the true state of the world is z˜ and the incumbent plays q, then the
policy outcome is
yL ≡ y(b1, q, z˜).
By Lemma 3 the only two states consistent with this observation are z(yL) ≡ zL and
z(yL) = z˜. Similarly, when the incumbent plays q in state z˜, then the voter knows after
observing
yH ≡ y(b1, q, z˜)
that the true state of the world must be z(yH) = z˜ or z(yH) ≡ zH .
The pairs (yL, zL) and (yH , zH) allow for a simple characterization of equilibrium play
in states z < zL and z > zH . To see this, consider for example the voter’s inference and
voting behavior after observing y1 < y
L. Either the incumbent has played q, in which
case the state is z(y1) < z˜, or he has played q, in which case the state is z(y1) < z(y1) < z˜.
Whether z(y1) or z(y1) is the true state, the voter knows that the true state is smaller
than z˜. Consequently, it follows (see Lemma 2 and Proposition 1) that the voter elects L
for any beliefs µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) ∈ [0, 1] consistent with Lemma 3 when observing y1 < yL.
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Figure 4: Illustration of Lemma 4.
Now, given that L is (re)elected for any state z < zL, both types of incumbent optimally
play q in these states to decrease disutility c(y1). Similarly, when the voter observes
y1 > y
H , the only states consistent with this observation satisfy z(y1) > z(y1) > z˜.
Therefore, the voter correctly infers that the state is larger than z˜ and thus votes for
R for any beliefs µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) ∈ [0, 1] consistent with Lemma 3. But given that R is
(re)elected for any z > zH , both types of incumbent optimally choose q in these states.
These results are summarized as follows:
Lemma 4 The voter elects L if y1 < y
L and R if y1 > y
H . Both types of incumbent
play q for z < zL and z > zH .
Figure 4 illustrates Lemma 4. It depicts the policy outcome y1 as a function of state
z and quality q1(z) ∈ {q, q}. The figure also shows that whenever y1 < yL, the voter
knows that z < z˜. She therefore votes for L with certainty. The incumbent chooses q
as he cannot affect her voting behavior. Similarly, the voter knows that z > z˜ whenever
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y1 > y
H . Hence, the incumbent has again no possibility to affect her voting behavior
when z > zH and therefore chooses again q. Note that the incumbent’s choice of q1 is
highlighted in the figure with a solid line on the corresponding y1-function.
When the voter observes a policy outcome y1 ∈ [yL, yH ], her voting behavior is less
clear-cut and depends on her beliefs about the quality chosen by the incumbent.13 How-
ever, when L is the incumbent, it turns out that the equilibrium play is straightforward.
To see this, suppose L always chooses q in period one and observe that if L plays this
strategy, it will be fully revealing. Hence, the only beliefs consistent with this strategy
will be that L has played q, i.e. µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = 0 for all observations y1 made on the
equilibrium path. Given that she correctly infers what the true state is, she optimally
votes for L if and only if she observes y1 < yL. But given that she plays this strategy
and holds these beliefs, L has clearly no incentive to deviate and play q: If z ≥ z˜ this
would lead to a policy outcome y1 that L likes less than if he plays q without changing
the fact that he is voted out of office. For z ∈ [zL, z˜) he is, in addition to the worse
policy outcome, voted out of office in states where he would be reelected if he played q.
Last, for z < zL he gets reelected with any q1(z), but playing q leads to a better policy
outcome. Therefore, the strategies and beliefs we have just described constitute a PBE.
In Appendix A, we show that it is the unique PBE.
Proposition 2 The q-Game with incumbent L has a unique PBE. In this equilibrium,
• L plays q for any z in period one,
• the voter reelects L for y1 < y(b1, q, z˜) and elects R otherwise,
13This contrasts with the cases y1 < yL and y1 > yH analyzed in Lemma 4, where the voting behavior
is the same for any µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) ∈ [0, 1].
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• the voter’s beliefs are µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = 0 for y1 < y(b1, q, a) and µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = 1
otherwise.
The proposition tells us that an incumbent of type L always chooses high quality q.
He will not deviate because he dislikes high policy outcomes y1 and cannot improve his
reelection prospects by playing low quality q. On the contrary, playing q could make the
voter think that the state of the world z is higher than it actually is, making him more
inclined to vote for R. Hence, incumbent L’s strategic incentives are well aligned with
the common interest in low y1. Observe that our restrictions on off equilibrium beliefs
do not matter here because the only off equilibrium observations are y1’s that are so
large that they can only result from the play of q in states z > z˜. Hence, off equilibrium
beliefs are pinned down even without our additional restriction.
The case with incumbent R is quite different from the one where L is the incumbent
because there is no fully separating PBE with incumbent R. To see this, observe first
that due to Lemma 4 the only candidate for a fully separating equilibrium is the one
where R plays q for all z. In such an equilibrium, R is reelected if and only if z ≥ z˜.
But then R has an incentive to deviate and play q for z close to but below z˜ because
this would induce the voter to reelect him.
To understand the equilibrium with incumbent R, it is useful to begin with the
hypothetical situation where R plays q in state z(y) and q in state z(y) with probability
λ > 0. This will later be helpful in determining the off equilibrium beliefs of the voter, her
behavior on and off the equilibrium path and the equilibrium behavior of the incumbent.
Lemma 5 Suppose that in period one R plays q with probability λ > 0 for any z ∈ (zL, z˜)
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Figure 5: Illustration of Lemma 5.
and q with probability λ for any z ∈ (z˜, zH). Then there exists a y′ ∈ (yL, yH) such that
the voter is indifferent between L and R when observing y′. If y′ is unique, the voters
elects R if and only if y1 ≥ y′.
A simple but by no means tight sufficient condition for y′ to be unique is that the
distribution f(z) is uniform. For simplicity, we subsequently assume that y′ is unique.
However, as we show in Appendix B, none of our main results is qualitatively affected if
y′ is not unique. Figure 5 illustrates Lemma 5 for the case that y′ is unique.
Lemma 5 states that whenever the voter observes a policy outcome y1 ∈ (yL, yH),
which can occur because R plays with a certain probability q in states z < z˜ or because
R plays with the same probability q in states z > z˜, then the voter elects R if y1 ≥ y′,
and L otherwise. Intuitively, whenever y1 is slightly below y
H , the voter knows that the
true state of the world is either slightly below z˜, in which case she would be somewhat
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better off with L, or slightly below zH , in which case she would be much better off with
R. Hence, she votes for R, as this maximizes her expected utility. Conversely, when y1
is slightly above yL, the voter knows that she would either strongly prefer L or have a
weak preference for R if she knew the true state of the world z. She therefore votes for
L.
We are now able to derive the equilibrium of the q-Game when the incumbent is of
type R. To simplify the subsequent discussion, we denote the two states that are in
principle consistent with y′ by
z′ ≡ z(y′) and z′ ≡ z(y′).
Note that z′ ∈ (zL, z˜) and z′ ∈ (z˜, zH) since y′ ∈ (yL, yH). From Lemma 5 follows that
the voter reelects R after observing a policy outcome y1 ∈ [y′, yH) when R plays q for
all z ∈ [z′, z˜) and q for all z ∈ [z′, zH). The voter does so even though she is aware that
the observed y1 can result from R having played q in state z(y1) < z˜ or from R having
played q in state z(y1) > z˜.
The intuition is the following. Given an observation y1 ≥ y′, voting for R maximizes
her expected utility, where the expectation is taken with respect to her beliefs. These
beliefs, in turn, are updated using Bayes’ rule for observations that are consistent with
R’s equilibrium strategy. For observations smaller than y′, which are off equilibrium, her
beliefs must be such that her expected utility of voting for L exceeds her expected utility
of voting for R. Our restriction on off equilibrium beliefs implies that this is the case.
Therefore, R indeed wants to play q for all z ∈ [z′, zH) as this leads to his reelection and
minimizes y1. For z ∈ [z′, z˜), playing q leads to R’s reelection and is therefore indeed
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optimal for R since playing q would lead to y1 < y
L and, consequently, to the election of
L.
Before proceeding further, we now introduce the assumption on the support [a, a]
referred to above. Though all we really need for a is a < z′, we assume for expositional
ease a < zL. Similarly, though the following assumption on a is by no means necessary
for our main results, it simplifies the characterization of equilibrium play substantially.
Consequently, we assume z(y(b1, q, z
′)) < a. In words, z(y(b1, q, z′)) is a state such that
y1 is the same if high quality is chosen in this state as when low quality is chosen in state
z′. That is, we assume:14
Assumption 2
a < zL and z(y(b1, q, z
′)) < a.
Lemma 5 further implies that when R would play q for all z ∈ [zL, z′) and q for all
z ∈ [z˜, z′), then the voter would vote for L when observing the corresponding policy
outcome y1 < y
′. Therefore, R plays q for z ∈ [z˜, z′) to make clear that z ≥ z˜, which
ensures his reelection, and q for z ∈ [zL, z′) to reduce y1 (as he is not reelected anyway).
In equilibrium, R thus plays q for z ∈ [z′, z′) and q otherwise and is reelected whenever
z ≥ z′. The following proposition provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium:
Proposition 3 The q-Game with incumbent R has a unique PBE that satisfies our
restriction on off equilibrium beliefs. In this equilibrium,
• R plays q for z ∈ [z′, z′) and q for any other z in period one,
14Assumption 2 is a simultaneous constraint on the support of z, the preferences of the voter and the
technology. In terms of technology, it essentially requires that the difference y(b, q, z)− y(b, q, z) is not
too large, i.e., that the inefficiency of low quality policies is moderate.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium in the q-Game with incumbent R.
• the voter elects L for y1 < y′, and reelects R otherwise,
• the voter’s on equilibrium beliefs are µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = 0 for y1 < y(b1, q, z′) and for
y1 ≥ y(b1, q, z′), and µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) for y1 ∈ [y′, y(b1, q, z′)),
• the voter’s off equilibrium beliefs are µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) for y1 ∈
[y(b1, q, z
′), y′) and µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = 1 for y1 > y(b1, q, a).
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 6. The incumbent R plays q for z < z′ and z ≥ z′,
and q for intermediate z’s, while the voter reelects R if y ≥ y′ and elects L otherwise.
Under full information, incumbent R would be reelected if z ≥ z˜, and voted out
of office otherwise. With asymmetric information about the true state of the world z,
R is reelected in equilibrium for any z ≥ z′. Hence, asymmetric information increases
R’s ex ante reelection probability, i.e., his reelection probability before observing z, by
F (z˜) − F (z′), which is strictly positive since z′ < z˜. The difference F (z˜) − F (z′) is
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thus naturally interpreted as the size of R’s incumbency advantage due to asymmetric
information.15 Note that when observing y1 ∈ [y′, y(b1, q, z′)) and voting for R the
voter is aware that under full information she would rather vote for L with probability
f(z(y1)
f(z(y1))+f(z(y1))
. Incumbent R can use his information advantage to increase his reelection
prospects because he only manipulates the voter’s beliefs about z (i.e. induces the voter’s
belief distribution to be non-degenerate) when the manipulated beliefs are such that her
expected utility is higher when voting for R than when voting for L.
The role of our restriction on the off equilibrium beliefs is to pick a unique equilibrium
(see claim 3.4 in the proof). In absence of this restriction, there would be multiple PBE
that differ with respect to the equilibrium outcome. All of these PBE are characterized
by some y∗ ∈ [y′, yH ], such that R plays q(z) = q for all z ∈ [z(y∗), z(y∗)) and is
reelected whenever he plays q. The voter’s off equilibrium beliefs have to be sufficiently
high such that she would optimally elect L when observing an off equilibrium y1 < y
∗.
Clearly, such off equilibrium beliefs are consistent with PBE in absence of any additional
restrictions, and they deter any deviation by incumbent R. Observe, however, that these
off equilibrium beliefs must exceed the prior probability f(z(y1))
f(z(y1))+f(z(y1))
whenever y∗ > y′.
Our restriction does not allow for such punishing beliefs as it requires off equilibrium
beliefs to be formed not only under the insight that an off equilibrium observation y1
can normally stem from two sources of errors, but also under the hypothesis that both
errors are equally likely. The assumption underlying all PBE but the one characterized
in Proposition 3 is that errors in low states are more likely than errors in high states.
15Assuming that the policy dimension is fixed, this is also the difference in ex ante probabilities that
the incumbent of type R is elected when he is an incumbent and when he is the challenger of a type L
incumbent. Hence, this definition of incumbency advantage is the same as the one advocated by Bevia´
and Llavador (2006).
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It is not clear why this should be particularly plausible. That said, our restriction does
not only pick a unique PBE, but also the one with the largest incumbency advantage.
However, all except one of the other PBE also exhibit a strictly positive incumbency
advantage (and none a negative incumbency advantage because y∗ ≤ yH).16
4 Equilibrium of the Full Game
In this section, we analyze the full game in which the incumbent can choose the observable
budget bt(z) ∈ {b, b} and the unobservable quality qt(z) ∈ {q, q} in both periods t = 1, 2.
Again we distinguish the game with incumbent L and the game with incumbent R.
First, note that the period two subgame is the same in the full game as it was in the
q-Game. Proposition 1 therefore applies, and R plays (b, q) for all z when in office in
period two, while L plays (b, q) for all z. Second, we look at the equilibrium outcome
in period one when the incumbent is of type L. In Proposition 2, we have seen that in
period one L plays q for all b1 and z, because playing q would increase y1 and might,
on top of that, even decrease his reelection prospects. Given that L plays q for all z
independently of his budget choice, the voter never faces any uncertainty about z and
reelects L if and only if z < z˜. But given that L cannot increase his reelection prospects
anyway, he has no reason not to choose his preferred budget b in period one.
Proposition 4 The full game with incumbent L has a unique PBE. The equilibrium
outcome is identical to the one described in Proposition 2 with the addition that b1(z) = b.
16Moreover, all PBE are intuitive in the sense of Cho and Kreps (1987). To see this, note that both
the z(y1)-type and the z(y1)-type of incumbent R could possibly gain by deviating from equilibrium
behavior provided the voter deviates from her strategy in the off equilibrium range. The z(y1)-type’s
potential gain is reelection instead of losing office, while the z(y1)-type’s potential gain is reelection with
a better policy outcome instead of reelection with a worse outcome. Thus, all PBE are consistent with
the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
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We now turn to the full game when the incumbent is of type R. We have seen
in Proposition 3 that R plays q if he cannot affect his reelection prospects, but acts
strategically and plays q in states z ∈ [z′, z′) to ensure his reelection. The thresholds z′
and z′, however, depend on b1, as seen in equation (6). Therefore, R’s choice of (b1, q1)
may depend on whether he prefers being reelected with (b, q) or (b, q). This preference
may in general vary with the state, which complicates the analysis without affecting
the conclusions in any substantial way. However, if the difference between high and low
quality is small relative to the difference between a large and a small budget, then R will
always prefer being reelected with (b, q) to being reelected with (b, q). For simplicity, we
therefore introduce:
Assumption 3
uR(b, q, z) > uR(b, q, z) for all z ≤ z′(b).
It follows from Assumption 3 and uR(b, q, z) > uR(b, q, z) that uR(b, q, z) > uR(b, q, z)
for all z ≤ z′(b).
To derive the equilibrium, we focus on R’s equilibrium strategy in all states z. We
begin with high z’s: Whenever z ≥ z′(b), R can play his most favored policies (b, q)
and is reelected nevertheless. The reason is that these policies lead to a policy outcome
y1 ≥ y′(b) that induces the voter to reelect R even if y1 could also result from R having
played (b, q) in state z(b1, y1).
Given that in equilibrium R plays (b, q) for z ≥ z′(b), R is reelected in states z ∈
[z′(b), z′(b)) when playing (b, q), but not when playing (b, q). Hence, in these states R
plays (b, q) because this is his most preferred policy bundle that ensures his reelection.
Whenever z < z′(b), R is not reelected when playing b because this would lead to an
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outcome y1 < y
′(b). Moreover, he would also not be reelected when playing b because he
never plays b for any z ≥ z′(b) in equilibrium. Thus, the voter would know with certainty
that z < z′(b) when observing b. As there is no way of being reelected, R plays his most
favored policies (b, q) for z < z′(b).
Proposition 5 The full game with incumbent R has a unique PBE satisfying our restric-
tion on off equilibrium beliefs. The equilibrium outcome is identical to the one described
in Proposition 3 with the addition that b1(z) = b for all z.
This proposition implies that R has an incumbency advantage equal to F (z˜)− F (z′(b))
in the full game. The incumbency advantage would be no lower without Assumption 3.
To see this, note first that in equilibrium R plays (b, q) for all z ≥ z′(b) independently
of whether Assumption 3 holds or not. He can therefore always ensure his reelection for
all z ≥ z′(b) by playing (b, q) for z ∈ [z′(b), z′(b)). Hence, his incumbency advantage is
at least F (z˜)−F (z′(b)). Moreover, if Assumption 3 did not hold and if z′(b) < z′(b) and
z′(b) < z′(b), the incumbency advantage could even be greater because in equilibrium
R might then play (b, q) in some states z ∈ [z′(b), z′(b)), such that he could ensure his
reelection in some states z ∈ [z′(b), z′(b)) by playing (b, q). In summary, none of our
main results would be affected if we did not make Assumption 3.
5 Empirical Evidence
One implication for observables of our model is that prior to elections incumbents should,
for some states of the world, generate mediocre policy outcomes in the policy dimension
in which they are commonly perceived as strong. In this section, we discuss and pro-
vide empirical evidence that is consistent both with this prediction and with our main
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assumptions. We also present evidence that for the five largest developed democracies
the chances of an incumbent president, chancellor or prime minister being reelected are
greater than fifty percent.
5.1 Assumptions
A key assumption of our model is that parties differ with respect to their preferred
policies and that voters prefer one party to the other depending on the state of the
world. There is ample empirical evidence that left-wing parties favor public spending for
combatting poverty, unemployment and low economic growth, while right-wing parties
take a tougher stand on fighting crime and terrorism (see e.g. Hicks and Swank, 1992;
Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Medina-Ariza, 2006). Opinion poll data suggest that voters
understand these policy differences and choose their electoral support according to what
they perceive as the most important issues on the political agenda. For the United
States, Newport and Carroll (2004) document large differences in what Republicans and
Democrats considered to be the ”most important problem facing the nation” in the
years 2003 and 2004. While 16% of Democrats considered unemployment to be the
most important problem, only 8% of Republicans did so; and while 13% of Republicans
considered terrorism to be the most important problem, only 6% of Democrats did so.
In addition, 69% of the voters who see terrorism as the most important issue in 2006
think that Republicans are better suited to fight terrorism, while only 17% think that
Democrats are better suited (Newport and Carroll, 2006).
One of the key findings in the empirical literature on political business cycles (PBC) is
that economic growth in the U.S. is higher under Democrats than Republicans in the first
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half of their terms and that growth significantly decreases for Democrats in the second
half of their terms (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997; Drazen, 2000). Further evidence
that parties differ significantly with respect to the policy outcomes they generate when
in office is provided in Tables 1 and 2 below. Table 1 shows that the homicide rate is
significantly lower if the incumbent is politically right and Table 2 illustrates that the
growth rate is larger if the incumbent belongs to the political left.
It is also worth mentioning that the strategically chosen inefficiencies prior to elections
do not annihilate the long-term differences between parties. Whatever the incentives
to distort, right-wing incumbents have empirically a better overall record on fighting
homicides and left-wing incumbents have a better growth record.
Evidence that the voters’ support for one party relative to another depends on their
beliefs about the state of the world is provided by Berrebi and Klor (2006). They
document that Israeli voters tend to elect the left-wing party (Labor) when few people
died in terror attacks in the months before the elections, and the right-wing party (Likud)
when many people died in terror attacks. They find a statistically significant increase
in the support for the right-wing party when the number of terror fatalities rises.17
Moreover, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004, p.1) find that political betting markets “suggest
that issues outside the campaign - like the state of the economy, and the progress on the
war on terror - are the key factors in the forthcoming [2004 U.S. presidential] election”.
We conclude that there is fairly broad support for our assumptions.
17Specifically, an increase in the number of terror fatalities in Israel from its monthly average of seven
to eight causes a significant increase of 0.4 percent in the support for Likud, Israel’s right-wing party.
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5.2 Predictions
Our model predicts that prior to elections parties should for some states of the world
implement policies they are perceived as tough at inefficiently. In a study on terrorism
and electoral outcomes, Berrebi and Klor (2006) provide evidence that is consistent with
this perhaps paradoxical prediction. They show that right-wing incumbents impose total
or partial closures on Westbank or Gaza much less frequently before elections than left-
wing incumbents. This finding is consistent with the notion that prior to elections right-
wing incumbents take less precautions against terror attacks than left-wing incumbents
even though they have the reputation of being tougher.
Though by definition the inefficient policies in our model are not observed, the model
has the observable implication that in these situations incumbents should generate be-
low average policy outcomes in the policy dimension in which they are commonly and
correctly (at least as suggested by Tables 1 and 2) perceived as strong. To the best of
our knowledge there are no papers in the literature that provide a direct test of this
phenomenon of ”mediocre policy outcomes”. We have therefore collected annual data
for all OECD countries between 1975 and 2004 with the aim of explaining differences in
the levels of homicides and (short-run) economic growth rates with the help of political
factors identified in our model.
In Table 1 we test the prediction of the model that a right-wing incumbent has
incentives to put less effort into fighting crime when he runs for reelection using OLS-
regressions. This effect is likely to be strongest in the one or two years preceding elections.
The dependent variable in Table 1 is the number of homicides per hundred thousand
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people. This data is provided by the World Health Organization (2006) and is collected
from local doctors reporting the cause of death of patients. It is widely used in the
literature and is recognized as a very reliable data source (see e.g. Gartner, 1990). Table
2 reports results from OLS-regressions of the annual growth rate of GDP per capita,
taken from the World Bank (2006b), on a number of explanatory variables.
Various independent variables are included in the regressions presented in Tables 1
and 2. First, there are dummy variables for the political orientation of the government.
The dummy variable ”Right” takes a value of 1 if the party in power is to the political
right, and 0 otherwise. The variables “Center” and ”Left” are analogously defined. The
coding is based on data from the “Database of Political Institutions” (DPI), which is
described in Beck et al. (2001). Another key variable is the one labelled “Electoral
concerns (y1)”. It is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the incumbent
can run for reelection and elections take place within one year or less. This variable
has been coded using data on election dates from Brender and Drazen (2005) and the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2006), as well as data
on term limits and on the number of terms served by a particular incumbent, taken from
Johnson and Crain (2004), Za´rate (2007) and various national sources. The variable
“Electoral concerns (y2)” is defined and constructed analogously to “Electoral concerns
(y1)”, except that it covers the two years preceding the election.
Several control variables are included. “Education spending” refers to the public
education spending in percent of GDP and is taken from the World Bank (2006a). The
variable “Capital formation” captures the capital formation in percentage of GDP, ”Gov-
ernment spending” corresponds to the general government final consumption expendi-
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ture in percent of GDP, and “GDP” refers to the gross domestic product per capita at
constant prices. The latter three variables are provided by the World Bank (2006b).
Table 1 presents the results for the homicide rate. In column 1 we see that right-wing
incumbents are on average associated with a significantly lower homicide rate. Also, on
average incumbents with electoral concerns do a significantly better job in fighting crime.
However, our model predicts that this should not necessarily be the case for right-wing
incumbents who prior to elections may have incentives to fight crime inefficiently. This
is tested in column 2 with the help of the interaction term of “Electoral concerns (y1)”
and “Right”. As the model predicts, this interaction term is positive and significantly
so. Columns 3 and 4 show that these results are robust to the inclusion of time effects,
country fixed effects and the control variables of government spending and GDP.18
18We believe that government spending and GDP capture important characteristics of a society.
However, we would have liked to control for other factors, such as police spending. Unfortunately, we
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Another important robustness check is to see whether this effect is also present for
center or left incumbents. If this were the case, this would contradict the model’s pre-
dictions. As shown in columns 5 and 6, the effect does not hold for left and center
incumbents. As additional robustness check in column 7 the variable of electoral con-
cerns focussing on a longer time span (2 years) before the elections is included. As above,
the interaction term of “Electoral concerns (y2)” and “Right” is positive and significant,
which is in line with our model.
Table 2 reports results for incumbents and short-run economic growth rates.19 The
interaction term of “Electoral concerns (y1)” and “Left” is negative and significant once
fixed effects are included. We therefore conclude that left-wing incumbents do a poorer
job in promoting growth when they have electoral concerns than otherwise, which is
consistent with the predictions of our model.
Observe also that these results are perfectly in line with the empirical findings of the
PBC literature noted above. Moreover, our model provides a theoretical explanation for
the observed economic slowdowns at the end of the first term under Democratic U.S.
presidents and for the absence of such slowdowns under Republican presidents.
In column 4 several control variables are included. Capital formation is shown to
enhance the economic performance, while government spending and the GDP level reduce
the growth rate. Columns 5 and 6 show that the effect is, as predicted, not present for
right and center incumbents. Column 7 shows that the findings are robust to the use of
the two-year “Electoral concerns (y2)” variable.
could not include this variable due to the large number of missing observations.
19Appendix C presents a sketch of the model when the policy outcome y is a good rather than a
bad. It shows that the incumbent who is strong in fostering y has incentives to use inefficient policies
to downward distort the outcome for intermediate states of the world.
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5.3 Incumbency Advantage
We conclude this section by providing evidence about the existence of an incumbency
advantage, a topic that has received considerable attention in the literature. Most contri-
butions focus on parliamentary elections. However, there is also substantial evidence for
an incumbency advantage in U.S. gubernatorial elections (e.g., Petterson, 1982; Tomp-
kins, 1984; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002; Ansolabehere, Snowberg and Snyder, 2006).
We have collected data on the reelection frequency of incumbent presidents, chancellors
or prime ministers for the five largest developed democracies, i.e. USA, Japan, Germany,
UK and France. In Figure 7 the reelection rates for incumbents are displayed.20 In all of
20The following definitions apply: “Percentage reelected of those who run” are incumbents reelected
divided by the number of incumbents running for office; “Percentage reelected of those who could run”
are incumbents reelected divided by the sum of incumbents who run and incumbents who could run,
but resign less than a year before the election for non-medical reasons. The following periods are
covered: USA, 1789-2006; Japan, 1945-2006; Germany, 1945-2006; UK, 1900-2006; France, 1945-2006.
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Figure 7: Incumbency Advantage.
those countries at least half of the incumbents who could seek reelection are successful
and between 57 (UK) and 79 percent (Germany) of those who do seek reelection are
reelected.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a dynamic game with incomplete information that shows
that an incumbent may choose inefficient policies to increase his reelection chances. In
particular, he chooses inefficient policies to induce uncertainty about the true state of
the world whenever the states are such that the voter’s expected utility of reelecting him
exceeds her expected utility of voting for the challenger. It is worth emphasizing that the
voter reelects the incumbent even though she is fully rational and thus perfectly aware of
the fact that the incumbent may have chosen inefficient policies to ensure his reelection
in states of the world in which she would be better off with the challenger.
The predictions of our model are supported by empirical evidence. Using panel
The data is from the following sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(2006), Za´rate (2007), Encyclopædia Britannica, CIA World Factbook, and various national information
sources.
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data for the OECD countries between 1975 and 2004, we show that homicide rates
are higher under right-wing incumbents with electoral concerns and short-run economic
growth is lower under left-wing incumbents with electoral concerns. Further research on
informational asymmetries and elections seems fruitful.
Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2: Because c′′(y) ≥ 0, y(b, q, z) < y(b, q, z) and ∂y(b, q, z)/∂z >
∂y(b, q, z)/∂z, ∆ui(z) strictly increases in z. Continuity of c(y) in y and of y(b, q, z) in z
imply that ∆ui(z) is continuous in z. Hence, for every i a unique z˜i exists. The ordering
(5) holds because ∆ui(z) decreases in αi, which implies that z˜i increases in αi. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: We begin with an implication of Lemma 4. Observe first that
the lemma implies that for all z ≥ z˜, R is (re)elected after the incumbent has played q.
Similarly, for z < z˜, L is (re)elected after the incumbent has played q. Consequently,
there is no z ∈ [a, a] such that L is (re)elected when q has been played and R is (re)elected
when q has been played. Since playing q leads moreover to better policy outcomes (i.e.
lower c(y1)), there can be no equilibrium in which L plays q for any z. ¥
Proof of Lemma 5: The proof contains four steps. For notational ease, we write
µ(y1) ≡ µ(z(y1) | b1, y1).










when observing y1 ∈ (yL, yH). Since f(z) > 0 for any z, µ(y1) ∈ (0, 1) for any y1 ∈
(yL, yH).
Second, given her beliefs, the voter plays v(y1) = r if and only if
Eµ(∆uM | y1) = µ(y1)∆uM(z(y1)) + [1− µ(y1)]∆uM(z(y1)) ≥ 0, (8)
where Eµ denotes the expectation taken with respect to beliefs µ(y1). Since uM(z)
strictly and continuously increases in z and since z(y1) > z˜ > z(y1), it follows for any
given y1 ∈ (yL, yH) that Eµ(∆uM | y1) strictly and continuously decreases in µ(y1), that
Eµ(∆uM | y1) < 0 if µ(y1) = 1, and that Eµ(∆uM | y1) > 0 if µ(y1) = 0. Hence, for
any y1 ∈ (yL, yH) there is a unique belief µ˜(y1) ∈ (0, 1) such that Eµ(∆uM | y1) = 0.
Moreover, µ˜(y1) = 0 if y1 = y
L and µ˜(y1) = 1 if y1 = y
H . Further, µ˜(y1) increases in y1,
because Eµ(∆uM | y1) would increase in y1 when beliefs were kept constant.
Third, since µ˜(y1) continuously increases from zero to one as y1 increases from y
L
to yH and since µ(y1) is continuous and µ(y1) ∈ (0, 1) for any y1 ∈ (yL, yH), there is a
y′ ∈ (yL, yH) such that µ(y′) = µ˜(y′). When observing this y′ and when R plays the
strategy described in the lemma, then Eµ(∆uM | y′) = 0 such that the voter is indifferent
between L and R.
Fourth, if y′ is unique, then Eµ(∆uM | y1) ≥ 0 if and only if y1 ≥ y′, which implies
that the voter plays v(b1, y1) = r if and only if y1 ≥ y′. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof has two parts. We first prove that the strategy
profile and beliefs constitute a PBE that satisfies our restriction on off equilibrium beliefs.
Second, we show that there exists no other PBE that satisfies this restriction.
Part I (Existence): First, we show that R does not want to deviate given the voter’s
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strategy. Given z < z′, the voter plays v(b1, y1) = l for any q1(z). Hence, q is R’s best
response. Given z ∈ [z′, z′), the voter plays v(b1, y1) = r if and only if R plays q. Hence,
q is R’s best response. Given z ≥ z′, the voter plays v(b1, y1) = r for any q1(z). Hence,
q is R’s best response. Thus, given the voter’s strategy, R’s strategy is optimal.
Second, we show that the voter’s strategy is optimal given her beliefs. Given y1 <
y(b1, q, z
′) and beliefs µ(y1) = 0, v(b1, y1) = l is obviously the voter’s best response.
Given y1 ∈ [y(b1, q, z′), y′) and beliefs µ(y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) , v(b1, y1) = l is the voter’s
best response by construction of y′. Given y1 ∈ [y′, y(b1, q, z′)) and beliefs µ(y1) =
f(z(y1))
f(z(y1))+f(z(y1))
, v(b1, y1) = r is the voter’s best response by construction of y
′. Given
y1 ≥ y(b1, q, z′) and beliefs µ(y1) = 0, v(b1, y1) = r is the voter’s best response. Thus,
given the voter’s beliefs, her strategy is optimal.
Third, we show that on equilibrium the voter’s beliefs are updated according to Bayes’
rule and consistent withR’s strategy. GivenR’s strategy, observations y1 < y(b1, q, z
′) are
only consistent with R having played q. Hence, µ(y1) = 0 for such observations. Given
R’s strategy and observations y1 ∈ [y′, y(b1, q, z′)), µ(y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) by Bayes’ rule.
Given R’s strategy, observations y1 ∈ [y(b1, q, z′), y(b1, q, a)] are only consistent with R
having played q. Hence, µ(y1) = 0 for such observations. Thus, given R’s strategy, the
voter’s beliefs are consistent and updated using Bayes’ rule.
Fourth, we derive the voter’s beliefs off equilibrium. The observations y1 > y(b1, q, a)
are off equilibrium, but only consistent with R having played q. Hence µ(y1) = 1
for such observations. An observation y1 ∈ [y(b1, q, z′), y′) is consistent with q being
played in state z(y1) and q being played in state z(y1), both of which are not played on
equilibrium. Let ε > 0 be the probability that such an “error” occurs in either state and
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, which is the same as stated in the proposition. This completes the proof
of the existence part.
Part II (Uniqueness): We proceed as follows. Claim 3.1 rules out any mixed strategy
equilibria. Claims 3.2 to 3.4 rule out all alternative candidate pure strategy equilibria in
the interval [zL, zH ]. Further, Lemma 4 rules out any alternative equilibria for z < zL
and z > zH .
Claim 3.1: There are no equilibria in mixed strategies.
Proof: Due to his lexicographical preferences, R never mixes if the voter is more
likely to play v(b1, y1) = r after one q1(z) ∈ {q, q} than after the other. But whenever
the voter is equally likely to play v(b1, y1) = r, R plays q1(z) = q because c
′(y1) > 0.
Hence, R never mixes. As a consequence, the voter is (almost) never indifferent and does
not mix neither.
Claim 3.2: For any pair (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [zL, z˜)× [z˜, zH), there is no equilibrium with
q1(z(y1)) = q1(z(y1)).
Proof: Suppose q1(z(y1)) = q1(z(y1)) = q. Then, the voter’s beliefs are µ(y1) = 0
when observing y1 = y(b1, q, z(y)) or y1 = y(b1, q, z(y)). She thus plays v(b1, y1) = l if
y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)), and v(b1, y1) = r if y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)). But given this strategy of
the voter and since y(b1, q, z(y1)) = y(b1, q, z(y1)), R in state z(y1) has an incentive to
deviate and to play q1(z(y1)) = q.
Suppose therefore q1(z(y1)) = q1(z(y1)) = q. Then, the voter’s beliefs are µ(y1) = 1
when observing y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)) or y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)). She thus plays v(b1, y1) = l if
y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)), and v(b1, y1) = r if y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)). But given this strategy of the
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voter, R’s best response is to deviate in state z(y1) and to play q1(z(y1)) = q, because
he will not be reelected anyway and c′(y1) > 0.
Claim 3.3: For any pair (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [zL, z′)× [z˜, z′), there is no equilibrium with
q1(z(y1)) = q and q1(z(y1)) = q.
Proof: By definition of y′, when observing y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)) = y(b1, q, z(y1)) < y′,
the voter would play v(b1, y1) = l. Hence, R in state z(y1) would have an incentive to
deviate and to play q1(z(y1)) = q, which would lead to y1 > y
′ and therefore ensure his
reelection (see Lemma 4). Similarly, R in state z(y1) would have an incentive to play
q1(z(y1)) = q, as this would improve the policy outcome without affecting the probability
of reelection.
Claim 3.4: For any pair (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [z′, z˜)× [z′, zH), there is no equilibrium with
q1(z(y1)) = q and q1(z(y1)) = q that satisfies our restriction on the off equilibrium beliefs.
Proof: For q1(z(y1)) = q and q1(z(y1)) = q to be part of an equilibrium strategy
profile, R must have no incentive to play q(z(y1)) = q. To deter such a deviation, the
voter must play v(b1, y1) = l following the observation y1 = y(b1, q, z(y1)) ≥ y′. For




construction of y′ (and since y1 ≥ y′). However, as shown at the end of part I, the only
off equilibrium beliefs consistent with our restriction are f(z(y1))
f(z(y1))+f(z(y1))
. ¥
B Multiple thresholds y′
In this appendix, we show how our main results carry over to the case in which there
exist multiple thresholds y′ ∈ (yL, yH) as defined in Lemma 5. In the proof of Lemma 5,
the functions µ(y1) and µ˜(y1) were defined and shown to have the following properties:
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µ(y1) is a continuous function of y1 with range (0, 1) and µ˜(y1) is a continuous and
strictly increasing function of y1 that takes the value zero at y1 = y
L and the value one
at y = yH . Therefore, a y′ such that µ˜(y′) = µ(y′) exists. Moreover, because of these
properties it is readily checked that generically there is an odd number of such y′’s.
Trivially, the unique PBE with I = L carries over to any number of thresholds y′,
as they play no role in this PBE. To show how our PBE in the q-Game with I = R
generalizes to any odd number of thresholds y′, we present the results for the case of
three such thresholds: y′, y′′ and y′′′, satisfying yL < y′ < y′′ < y′′′ < yH . Observe that
the corresponding z-values must be ordered as follows: zL < z′ < z′′ < z′′′ < z˜ < z′ <
z′′ < z′′′ < zH .
It follows from Lemma 5 (and its proof) that the voter elects R if y1 ∈ [y′, y′′] or
y1 ≥ y′′′ and L otherwise, given that R plays q with probability λ > 0 for all z ∈ (zL, z˜)
and q with probability λ if z ∈ (z˜, zH). The statement equivalent to Proposition 3 is:
Proposition 6 The q-Game with incumbent R has a unique PBE that satisfies our
restriction on off equilibrium beliefs. In this equilibrium,
• R plays in period one q for z ∈ [z′, z′′], for z ∈ [z′′′, z′) and for z ∈ (z′′, z′′′), and
plays q otherwise,
• the voter reelects R if y1 ∈ [y′, y′′] or y1 ≥ y′′′, and elects L otherwise.
• On equilibrium, the voter’s beliefs are µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = 0 for y1 < y(b1, q, z′),
for y1 ∈ (y(b1, q, z′′), y(b1, q, z′′′)), for y1 ∈ [y(b1, q, z′), y(b1, q, z′′)] and for y1 ≥
y(b1, q, z
′′′), and they are µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) for y1 ∈ [y′, y′′], for
y1 ∈ [y′′′, y(b1, q, z′)) and for y1 ∈ (y(b1, q, z′′), y(b1, q, z′′′)).
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• Off equilibrium, i.e., for y1 ∈ [y(b1, q, z′), y(b1, q, z′′)], for y1 ∈ [y(b1, q, z′′′), y′) and
for y ∈ (y′′, y′′′), the voter’s beliefs are µ(z(y1)|b1, y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) .
Strategy of Proof: The proof that the given strategies and beliefs constitute a PBE
that satisfies our restriction on off equilibrium beliefs can be done in exactly the same
manner as Part I (Existence) of the proof of Proposition 3.
The proof that this PBE is the unique PBE that satisfies our restriction on off equilib-
rium beliefs corresponds to Part II (Uniqueness) of the proof of Proposition 3. Note that
Claim 3.3 becomes relevant for any pairs (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [zL, z′)×[z˜, z′) or (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈
[z′′, z′′′) × [z′′, z′′′), and Claim 3.4 for any pairs (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [z′, z′′) × [z′, z′′) or
(z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [z′′′, z˜)× [z′′′, zH). ¥
As Proposition 6 shows, the main results remain qualitatively unchanged: R plays q
for some z, he is reelected whenever he plays q, and he has an incumbency advantage
due to asymmetric information, as he is reelected for more z’s than he would be under
full information.
C The Model when the Policy Outcome is a Good
In this appendix, we provide a sketch of the model when the policy outcome y is a good
rather than a bad and when higher states z are desirable. One can think of y as the
economic growth rate. Let ui = −αib + c(y) be i’s utility when the policy outcome is
y and the budget is b. As before, assume that c(.) increases and is convex in y. Let
y = y(b, q, z). Because y is a good now, assume that y(b, q, z) > y(b, q, z) for any q
and z, y(b, q, z) > y(b, q, z) for any b and z and ∂y(b, q, z)/∂z > y(b, q, z)/∂z for all z
and q. Keeping the ordering αL > αM > αR the same as in the main text, R has the
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Figure 8: Equilibrium with I = R when y is a good.
greatest and L the smallest willingness to foster growth.21 Therefore, the ordering of the
threshold states z˜i is z˜R > z˜M > z˜L, where player i prefers budget b to b for any z < z˜i
given q = q. Let z˜ ≡ z˜M be the state such that the voter is indifferent between L and
R. Imposing the analogous condition as before, z˜L < a < z˜ < a < z˜R, makes sure that
both parties choose different budgets in period two and that the voter’s preferred party
depends on (her beliefs about) the state of the world.
The model and the equilibrium behavior are analogous to the model with a bad.
The sole difference is that now, for a fixed budget b, the outcome function y(b, q, z) is
above the function y(b, q, z), as illustrated in Figure 8. In the q-Game with incumbent
L, the incentives for the incumbent are well aligned with the public interest because he
never wants to induce a lower outcome than the one resulting from high quality. In the
equilibrium of the q-Game with incumbent R satisfying our restriction on off equilibrium
beliefs, R plays q for all z ∈ [z′, z′] and is reelected whenever he does so, where z′ and
21In light of the empirical evidence that left-wing parties are more inclined to enhance short-run
growth, this would mean that L is a right-wing party and R a left-wing party.
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z′ are defined in the same way as when y is a bad. In contrast to the model in the
main text, the voter now elects L for all y > y′ and reelects R otherwise. Without our
restriction on off equilibrium beliefs, there is a continuum of PBE that differ with respect
to the cutoff point y∗, which is such that v(y) = l for all y > y∗. Any y∗ ∈ [yL, y′] could
be such a cutoff point.
In the equilibrium of the full game, incumbent L chooses (b, q) for all z and incumbent
R chooses (b, q) for all z /∈ [z′, z′] and (b, q) otherwise under the assumption (which is
the same as Assumption 3 in Section 4) that R’s second most preferred policy bundle
absent political considerations is (b, q).
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